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ABSTRACTS 
REDEFINING LOYALISM— 
A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Although loyalism in its modern sense has been around since the 1920s, it ac-
quired its present shape only at the beginning of the 1970s. Then it was reborn in 
paramilitary form, and was used by other, more privileged, unionists to serve their 
own interests. Yet the sectarianism within which loyalism developed disguised the 
fact that less privileged members of the two communities had much in common. 
Separation bred hatred, and led to an unfounded sense of advantage on the part of 
many Protestants who in reality enjoyed few material benefits. The pursuit of ac-
commodation between the two communities can best be advanced by attempts to 
understand each other and to identify important shared interests, and the peace 
process can best be consolidated by steady, orchestrated movement on the two 
sides, and by ignoring the protests of those who reject compromise. 
REDEFINING LOYALISM— 
AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE 
In recent years a division has emerged within unionism between two sharply con-
trasting perspectives. On the one hand, traditional unionism has relied on a dis-
course of perpetuity, relying on long-standing values and political attachment to the 
old order, and seeing in the developments that have been taking place since 1998 
evidence of a creeping form of Irish unity. By contrast to these, “new loyalism”, rep-
resented in particular but not exclusively by the Progressive Unionist Party, is 
based on a reinterpretation of the past of unionism, seeing in this a pronounced 
and politically significant class structure, and putting the case for the defence of 
working class interests. This alternative vision rests on a more pluralistic concep-
tion of the politics of Northern Ireland. 
Publication information 
This contains the revised text of two lectures presented as part of the seminar se-
ries “Redefining the union and the nation: new perspectives on political progress in 
Ireland”, organised jointly by the Conference of University Rectors in Ireland and 
the Institute for British-Irish Studies. The lectures were presented in UCD on 6 No-
vember 2000. 
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 REDEFINING LOYALISM— 
A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
David Ervine 
I 
Let me give you my understanding of when and how loyalism was first defined. 
Loyalism was first defined around about 1971-72, when the great and the good 
within unionism decided that they needed to have a distancing process between 
themselves and those who, rather than talking a good fight or an argument, were 
actually physically prepared to fight. They embarked then on a process of develop-
ing for themselves a position which separated them from any sense of complicity in 
the problem that is Northern Ireland. I suppose it is best epitomised by identifying 
these people with those who live on the “Gold Coast”—and that is not Dublin 4 by 
the way, although it might be, it is actually an area outside Belfast where property 
values are very high, where the quality of life and the remuneration are substantial. 
The view of this group of unionists probably was that if all of the bad people would 
just go away, what a wonderful place it would be. 
Well, of course, paramilitarism is not something that our societies are immune to. In 
real terms the phenomenon of paramilitarism really was created in the 1970s, and 
therefore the question I would have for the great and the good, and for those who 
believe themselves not to be complicit in the circumstances that gave shape to 
Northern Ireland, is what on earth went wrong in the time when there were no pa-
ramilitaries? What actually happened when there were no rampant UDA, UVF or 
IRA? What was so wrong in our society that the circumstances of explosion were 
created? Could it be that the suppression of a group of people, the denial of politi-
cal exposure, the denial of any sense of capacity to influence the society in which 
they lived had some contribution to make or could act as some kind of cause that 
led to an explosion of violence? 
We have got to remember that 27 years of nationalist opposition in the early years 
of Northern Ireland brought nationalists to the heady heights where they managed 
to get one piece of legislation through the Stormont Parliament, a piece of legisla-
tion so insignificant that many see it as amusing—an amendment to the Wild Birds 
Act. That was nationalism’s contribution to the legal framework of the Northern Ire-
land state. This is an indictment. It is an indictment that puts an onus on those who 
feel themselves not to have been complicit to begin a digging process and to begin 
to look at where they contributed to the circumstances of this society. 
The way in which we had a one-party state; the way in which we did discriminate; 
the way in which we created circumstances where there were “them” and “us”—
these were the circumstances that undoubtedly create the conditions for bitterness 
and hatred, because “them” and “us” translated into another language is zero sum. 
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Yet the two communities live and lived often no more than 50 metres apart. If our 
trajectory was good we could hit each other, if our voices were loud we could hear 
each other, but we did not know each other, and indeed, we have never really 
known each other. We have been born in separate hospitals, go to separate 
schools, sign on at separate unemployment exchanges, and to add insult to injury 
we are buried in separate graveyards. Although there are other societies like this, 
the reality is that Northern Ireland is only 90 miles long by 90 miles wide. The sec-
tarian dichotomy is brutal and vicious. It sees 93 percent of us living in areas that 
are homogeneously Protestant or Catholic; only 7 percent of our society is mixed. 
Now I do not for a moment believe that sectarianism does not flourish in the draw-
ing rooms, or that it is absent among the privileged. It flourishes among all classes. 
In our family, we did not have a drawing room. The drawing room was in front of the 
fire where the TV was and where the tin bath went—nothing spectacular, nothing 
special. It was much the same as where many people lived in, both in Belfast and 
in Dublin and indeed in Newcastle and Manchester and Liverpool, Bradford and 
London and many other parts of this world. Here, too, sectarianism could grow. 
Sectarianism is a flower—a beautiful flower. It does not grow wild in a field—it is 
nourished. It is nourished and it is cared for; it is reproduced, generation after gen-
eration after generation. 
When I talk like this I have to pinch myself, because at one time I myself shared 
these views. When I was imprisoned in Long Kesh in 1974, people should be under 
no illusion that I would have blown up members of the other community, or shot 
them, because that was the capacity within my heart, the capacity of sense of 
siege, perhaps most manifest in the fear that the other side provoke. Of course, 
that is fairly understandable given that you do not know the other side, given that 
you can never appreciate the desires and hopes and dreams that they have, ones 
that in many ways mirror the hopes and desires and dreams that you have. 
Why is it that the price of a bag of coal, the price of a loaf, or the pathetic education 
system at working-class level in Northern Ireland has never drawn the people to-
gether? Could it be because of the beautiful flower? Could it be the circumstances 
of division? Could it be the flourishing of elitism? Could it be that there are those 
who do well from such division? I contend that that is the case. Why was it that in 
1922 the then Unionist government paid—as some are old enough to remember—
50 bob, two pounds ten shillings a week, to loyalist gunmen (even though they 
were not called loyalists then, they were just strange unionists) to shoot Catholics. 
If this sounds controversial, check the history—it is true. This arose from the inter-
ests of those who believed themselves to be in authority, those who believed them-
selves to be in control, those who believed that potentially they had something to 
lose. 
II 
The position is a bit different now but there are still some similarities. Why do the 
drug dealers ply their trade with impunity? Why do we live life in this way? Within 
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the last 14 months I have buried seven of my colleagues. Why is it that what many 
would see as thick, Neanderthal, stupid loyalism with its knuckles trailing the 
ground was effectively the only real bulwark and defence for the Good Friday 
Agreement on the Unionist side for some time? I may be the wrong person to say 
this, but why is it that I had to break every inch of ground that David Trimble walked 
on? Why is it that this had to happen? Why is it that we constantly have to chal-
lenge the reticence within Unionism? 
When my society is attacked from without, the questions and the challenges enter 
my community like an Exocet missile and explode inside, causing fear and trepida-
tion—or further fear and trepidation. We then do what all tribes do; we weld our-
selves into an homogeneous unit to be driven by the lowest common denominator 
because of the fear of what is outside the tribe. That tells me that the only real, 
valuable debate about unionism is within the unionist community. It is a question of 
defining who we are and what we are; the simple terms in which we see ourselves 
and indeed in which others see us are quite frankly frightening. There have to be 
circumstances within which we have our own security, our own confidence, our own 
belief. The alternative is that the people of Northern Ireland define that which they 
do not want rather than embrace that which they do want, and that, surely, leads to 
a constantly and continually negative politics. 
What conceivable good can come out of a continually negative politics—what, other 
than fear and trepidation? If we are witnessing the people of Northern Ireland, es-
pecially the unionist population, living in some sense of fear and trepidation at the 
moment, why would they be otherwise? All of their leaders—and not just some of 
them—have been telling them for 30 years to look at their boots, to walk with a sol-
emn demeanour: “you’re sold out”, “you’re beaten”; “you’ve every right to be fright-
ened”, “the betraying British government”, “the preying Irish government”. When the 
violence of the republican movement is added to all of those things, it confirms for 
the Dr Paisleys of this world that from their own point of view it is best to be de-
feated than to compromise. Remember that his church is called the Martyrs’ Memo-
rial Church! 
Well there are no martyrs about my party. We are about a new society. We are 
about pluralism. We are about justice. We are about equality. This is the year 2000, 
and we have politicians on this island talking about wanting equality, talking about 
needing justice. The year 2000! Is that not an indictment in itself, an indictment of 
how the world failed to do what it needed to do what it should have done? We still 
have to argue that there is no consciousness abroad that fully understands the 
complexities of the Northern Ireland circumstances. When the Americans and in-
deed at times the British arrive here—people who mean very well and who think 
that a handshake will do the job—they have got another think coming. We all know 
that. We are not going to wash away or wipe away the fears and trauma of genera-
tions, passed on and nurtured, much like the flower I referred to. We have to start 
almost afresh, and we start on the basis of equality; we start on the basis of our 
own appreciation of someone else. 
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When I was a kid we used to shout “we are the people”. Of course, that meant that 
somebody else was not part of the people, but I did not realise that at the time. But 
now we would settle for being “a” people. We have been through a lot. We have 
been through some substantial trauma. But when I think about being a traditional 
unionist, and from a traditional unionist’s point of view that means being a respect-
able unionist, well I frankly have no desire to be a respectable unionist in that con-
text. I want to be a human being, and I want the human beings in my society to rec-
ognise the politics of commonality—the issues that unite us rather than divide us, 
the circumstances that we need to come to terms with, the promises that we owe to 
each other: the right to live in peace, the right to live where you wish, the right to 
live free and unmolested for your political or religious beliefs. 
These are true core issues for us. I remember when the Good Friday Agreement 
was being negotiated in its draft form we offered the theory of radical change. We 
argued that we did not want a “Paddy” bill of rights, we wanted a bill of rights. We 
did not want a bill of rights that just dealt with why Protestants and Catholics, or na-
tionalists, unionists, loyalists or republicans had found it difficult to live side by side. 
We just wanted rights for human beings—whether that was in relation to the fact 
that you were born with a defective circumstance that made you homosexual or 
whether that was an accident at birth that made you disabled, or less able-bodied, 
or whether it was whether you were born a Protestant or born a Catholic, or the big 
issue: whether you were born a male or a female. All of those things, if we are 
about building a modern society, are vaguely important—all of them. Absolutely all 
of them have equal validity. 
III 
If we in the Progressive Unionist Party and the so-called new loyalism are to play a 
role in the future of our society, it will be based on a constant, continuing fuelling of 
the debate within unionism. Unionism, through that debate, will become stronger. It 
will be less frightened, and issues such as “no guns, no government” will become 
less important. We have a coffee room in Stormont and the constant banter there is 
“no buns, no government.” The members there banter about it, we laugh about it, 
but we tell the population outside that we are unable to laugh with each other and 
that this issue is the most defining and critical circumstance that our society faces, 
and therefore it is always a “make or break” one. 
When an issue is always a “make or break” one, it becomes dangerous. I cannot 
know for sure whether Mr Trimble would have achieved his recent 54 and a bit per-
cent majority, as opposed to his 53 and a bit percent majority the last time, had he 
not tried to keep his supporters happy by imposing some form of sanction against 
Sinn Fein. I would have wished that this had not been necessary, but nevertheless 
he has to make that judgement call. We will never know whether or not he would 
have succeeded without introducing that sanction. 
There are two sides to every story, and whatever about my position, there is my 
equal and opposite in Northern Ireland and both sides have a responsibility that I 
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think they are seeking to address. I believe that Adams and McGuinness are genu-
ine. I would not have come this far if I did not believe this. The interesting thing is 
that loyalism was sold the Good Friday Agreement not by the television screens 
alone, or by the news media alone but by tramping up and down the whole of our 
country talking to small groups, large groups, trying to explain, explain, explain and 
explain again what lay in front of us. For one of the defining circumstances that was 
related to our supporters’ acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement, and indeed 
the acceptance of a loyalist cease-fire in the first instance, was the constant shift of 
the Republican movement. 
Few people will have read the “Green Book”, the IRA code. But the “Green Book” is 
something that most unionists think is about crossing the road; they see it as a 
“green cross code”, or something like that. Although these people in the unionist 
mindset believe that republicans have been killing them for 30 years, they never 
went out of their way to try and understand the mindset of republicanism. In under-
standing the mindset of republicanism we can see a seismic shift. We understand 
how difficult it must have been to turn the juggernaut, and we pay respect to and 
accept the bona fides of those who did that. No one told us it was going to be easy 
to accept the bona fides of the enemy, but there are some in my community who 
just do not want to see the wood for the trees. They do not want to know that Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGuinness exist and, better still, they do not even want de-
commissioning. The reality is that if decommissioning were to happen tomorrow the 
Democratic Unionist Party would turn into a large pail of defecation simply on the 
basis that their political careers would be over. They need the retention of weap-
ons. 
Now to be a little more controversial, so do I, and let me explain why. 
My community in Northern Ireland believes that conflict resolution comes in a plas-
tic bottle that is to be found on the shelf in the chemist’s shop, and you apply it like 
suntan lotion; or they believe that conflict resolution is an event. It is neither a sun-
tan lotion nor an event. It is a process; and when you are a politician, process pro-
tects. Process allows you to manoeuvre and take forward the arguments and the 
circumstances based upon the protection that process creates. We have not edu-
cated the unionist community well enough. We in the loyalist community have edu-
cated our people and worked hard at it, but the larger unionist community has not 
been educated well enough on the issues of process. Indeed, I witness the poten-
tial difficulties around the corner for the peace and political processes, but remem-
ber these are not one and the same thing. It is only when the peace process and 
the political process converge that perhaps we will come of age. 
But we watch as Gerry Adams struggles manfully with his constituency, David Trim-
ble with his, John Hume and Seamus Mallon with theirs, me with mine, Monica 
McWilliams with hers, Sean Neeson with his—all of the pro-agreement parties do 
so. We have not yet had the brainwave of seeing the need to develop our capacity 
to fend off attack, given that the Good Friday Agreement and its parameters prove 
the interdependency of the relationships between people—not just within Northern 
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Ireland, but between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and indeed between 
this island and the island of Great Britain. The picture is almost like a set of tent 
poles or a wigwam; you know that if you take one item away, they will all fall. 
IV 
So that tells me that the strength that we should be looking for is from each other. It 
must be based upon the “politics of need” rather than the mutually exclusive “poli-
tics of want” about which each side in a divided society keeps megaphoning the 
other. It is really now high time that loyalism, republicanism, unionism and national-
ism began the process of choreography to deliver to the people the benefits of the 
Good Friday Agreement. If we fail to deliver the benefits, the people will quite rea-
sonably argue that the Good Friday Agreement does not mean a great deal for 
them. But contained within the Good Friday Agreement, I believe, are substantial 
benefits for all of our people. It is therefore remiss of us not to get on with the job of 
delivering the benefits to the people as speedily as possible. 
I therefore advocate, or indeed demand, that we very soon begin the process of 
choreography that will on the one hand protect the politicians who have to make the 
dangerous and risky moves, while on the other hand ensuring that the people begin 
to recognise the flow of benefit to them, and support the politics of a new dimension 
rather than the old tired politics of the past. For David Trimble, let’s hear Ehud Ba-
rak; for Gerry Adams, let’s hear Yasser Arafat; for Real IRA, let’s hear Hamas. The 
processes of movement, change and dynamics in any divided society, especially a 
divided society with violence at its core, are the same. The moralists or the funda-
mentalists will always bite the ankles of the visionaries. There’s nothing new in that, 
as we should know. We as human beings should have studied that, but of course 
the theories of conflict resolution or suntan lotion or event are so underdeveloped 
that we have no science of such a thing. It is now in embryonic form, at its very be-
ginning, and we are going to learn more and more about it. We are never going to 
teach it in our schools because the issue of conflict is one of the things of which we 
have been victim since man inhabited this earth, and yet is the one science we do 
not have. We have obstetrics, we have mathematics and all kinds of sciences and 
yet we do not have a science that stops us killing each other. 
Why is that? Why is it that we have not developed as a people enough to encour-
age each other to have value for all other human beings—that we know each other 
as people rather than focusing on our perception of an unknown ideology which is 
different from ours? Why is it that we do not put our children in schools together? 
What have we to be frightened of when children at four or five years of age begin to 
know each other as human beings rather than finding out that they do not like 
someone simply on the basis of their ideology—especially if they have never really 
met them anyway? Is it not better that we build a society that has people with full 
educational ability? This should be not just the education of the “three Rs”, the edu-
cation of life. Education about how men relate to women might help us to begin to 
diminish the degree of domestic violence that happens not only in Belfast but also 
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in Dublin and right across society, whether you are working class, middle class or, 
indeed, if you have a few bob. 
I would like to finish with this thought, and I certainly hope that I am right. It is my 
belief that the conveyor belt which has begun on this island is unstoppable. There 
are, and have been, and will be again, dark days. But I do not believe that the peo-
ple can be forever denied the right to peace, justice and pluralism. I could have en-
gaged in dialogue about the reason why I was at two funerals today. But that would 
be a distraction from the bigger picture. We must remember that no matter what 
pain goes on around us, the bigger picture means a lot more in the longer term. 
There will be peace on this island. Indeed, there will be peace in the British Isles. 
But we must all realise that no one group, no one person has the capacity to define 
the price of this peace. 
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 REDEFINING LOYALISM— 
AN ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE 
James W McAuley 
Conflict in Ireland often seems so deeply entrenched as to be beyond solution. In 
part, this reflects the immensely powerful trope of nationalist Catholic identity which 
gave unionists nowhere to go. In turn, they have responded only with a conditional, 
ambiguous and ill-justified notion of Britishness which can never accommodate the 
nationalist population of Ulster. The deconstructions of monolithic representations of 
nationalist Irishness and unionist Britishness ... is a necessary precursor of political 
change (Graham, 1997: 13). 
INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary politics of Northern Ireland remain dominated by the search for a 
stable political settlement. One of the more important outcomes of this has been 
the increased fragmentation within the politics and social relations of unionism. In 
this paper, I want to consider how sections of Ulster unionism and loyalism have 
responded to contemporary events in Northern Ireland. 
That response has been fragmented and at times contradictory. In party political 
terms, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has consistently stated its distrust of, 
and has organised against, the “peace process”. Further, while the largest unionist 
grouping, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), has recently partly re-endorsed the 
working of the Northern Ireland Assembly, clearly many of its supporters are en-
gaged extremely reluctantly. The implications of the Ulster Unionist Party’s harden-
ing attitude to “guns and government” must put a question mark over the future of 
Stormont “power-sharing”. Beyond that there are important consequences for any 
reconstruction of loyalism, some of which I shall highlight in a few moments. 
Within unionism, it is only those political groupings originating in the loyalist para-
militaries, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and the Ulster Democratic Party 
(UDP), which have consistently been prepared to positively promote involvement in 
the search for a negotiated settlement. Central to this has been the surfacing, from 
deep within working class loyalism, of those openly challenging many of the values 
and structures of traditional unionism. 
In particular I wish to discuss and analyse the attempts in the contemporary period 
to redefine loyalism.1 Central to this will be an outline of the contours of contempo-
rary loyalism and the development of a newly articulated social democratic politics 
from some sections of Protestant working class communities. 
                                         
1 I wish to acknowledge the recent ESRC grant (AWARD L327253058) that I received with Jon Tonge from 
the University of Salford to carry out this work. 
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Indeed, the current period has witnessed a growing recognition from within key sec-
tions of loyalism that unionist politicians have largely absolved themselves of many 
social and economic responsibilities, by giving primacy to the constitutional issues. 
This has led not just to a reassessment of the unionist leadership and the Stormont 
system, but, in some cases, an attempt to redefine what loyalism means. This re-
flects a growing sense of awareness that the system in which they saw their union-
ism as playing a central role has failed for the loyalist community. Moreover, there 
is a growing sense that many unionist politicians are more concerned with restating 
their position on the constitution than they are in addressing the realities of every-
day life in working class loyalist areas. 
Hence, the views being expressed by the political leadership of the PUP offers a 
clear attempt to dispute and to reassess traditional unionist discourses. Central to 
this has been the challenge offered to the authority of the established unionist po-
litical leadership. As David Ervine once put it, the “bellicose ranting of the unionist 
that the world has become accustomed to is not real unionism. The real unionism is 
not unnecessarily jingoistic, it is not right wing but practical, if it is allowed to be so” 
(Sunday Times, 5 March 1995). Overall, this political movement has become popu-
larly known as “new loyalism”. 
WHAT IS “NEW LOYALISM”? 
So what is “new loyalism”? One way of characterising it is through those key fig-
ures, such as David Ervine and Billy Hutchinson, who have emerged to the fore-
ground. Even so, this needs to be set in context. Both Ervine and Hutchinson are 
ex-members of the loyalist paramilitary grouping, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). 
Indeed, they both were arrested within days of each other in late 1974, for paramili-
tary activities. In turn, along with many others, they were highly politicised during 
their period in jail and greatly influenced by Gusty Spence (initially, as Officer 
Commanding of the UVF in Long Kesh). Indeed, as the journalist, Peter Taylor put 
it: 
Spence more than any other single person sowed in the hard soil of Long Kesh the 
political ideas that were to flourish many years later in the form of the UVF’s new po-
litical party, the Progressive Unionist Party (Taylor, 2000: 141). 
Hence the real genesis of new loyalism is much earlier than many believe. Its con-
ception lies in the recognition by some of the inability of Ulster Unionism to repre-
sent their views and the growing political and economic marginalisation of many 
within Protestant working class communities. That is not to claim that such views 
were dominant, or to ignore the importance of sectarianism as an organisational 
feature of these communities. 
Thus, in 1977, when still UVF commander in Long Kesh, Spence issued a state-
ment claiming that violence was counterproductive and promoting reconciliation, 
claiming, “Let us reconcile and permit the grass and flowers to grow over the battle-
fields just as they have at the Somme and Passchendale” (cited in The Irish Times 
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December 1984). Spence resigned as UVF commander in March 1978 and was 
eventually released from prison in 1985. 
While the inception of the contemporary PUP can be found in the UVF’s attempt to 
organise party politically in 1974 (see McAuley and Hislop, 2000), its real momen-
tum came with the release from prison of certain figures, including Ervine and later 
Hutchinson, who began to openly articulate criticisms of unionism and the British 
state. This was particularly pertinent coming from those loyalists who had served 
time for what they regarded as defending the state. 
It should be noted that even as recently as 1995 the PUP was described by one 
lading journalist as a lone voice sounding in the loyalist’s wilderness (Brown, Fi-
nancial Times, 8 February 1995). Under the influence of its current leadership, 
however, the PUP has grown from a single branch of around 30 members located 
in the Shankill Road in Belfast to a structured party with a claimed membership of 
600. They have also had representative success, with six local councillors elected 
and representatives at the Forum Talks and in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
Billy Hutchinson explains the party’s development as follows: 
I think that ... the reason why the fringe parties have come out, [is] because there has 
been a war going on here for 25 years that has been fought by working-class people. 
The establishment parties have kept clear of it. They’ve never, ever got involved in it. 
They’ve always made sure that they’ve stayed out of jail. Whenever it came to actu-
ally trying to resolve the problem, nothing happened (An Phoblacht/ Republican 
News, 10, 2 February 1995). 
WHAT KIND OF PARTY IS THE PUP? 
The party that has emerged remains “intensely Unionist, but avowedly socialist in 
its ideology”. The party has consistently aired the view that it has been working-
class people who have suffered most from the conflict. As Ervine has expressed it: 
There can never, ever, be a return to the awful political and social abuses of the past 
and Stormont as we knew it is dead and gone, never to be resurrected. Granted 
there are those political dinosaurs who would opt for the “good old” sectarian and 
strata system of the past where everybody knew their place and forelock touching 
was the norm. We have had enough of that obnoxious trio ... bigotry, sectarianism 
and hypocrisy. We would oppose as vehemently and strenuously as anyone else a 
return to such a divisive and partisan system of government (PUP 2000). 
One central feature of the PUP project has been an attempt to reconstruct and rein-
terpret loyalism’s past. From this beginning the PUP has sought to locate its politics 
directly in the claim that this group were not being properly represented by the tra-
ditional unionist leadership and to provide a different understanding of the past from 
within unionism. As this statement explains: 
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For too long politics have been pronounced by those who have failed to consult and 
therefore mis-represent the views of the Unionist people especially in working class 
areas (PUP 1998). 
Likewise the PUP has continued to articulate a coherent analysis of the class struc-
ture of unionism. Take the following for example: 
We, too, the working class Protestants have felt the slow-burning agony of power-
lessness and ineffectuality. Sir Edward Carson warned the majority to treat the mi-
nority magnanimously. That advice from one of the Fathers of Unionism was not 
heeded and we have paid a heavy price. There are still those fools in Unionism who 
long for the heady Stormont days of privilege and patronage (Spence, 1995: 4). 
The party constitution, for example, includes the British Labour Party’s old Clause 
Four. The PUP has also, for example, claimed the need for direct state intervention 
in key areas of the economy. It has emphasised the need for strong state support 
for the health and social security services and in particular higher education, where 
they advocate a full return to state subsidised funding to the equivalent levels of 
1979 (See PUP, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c). 
Given the above policies, the PUP has sought to create and highlight the ideologi-
cal and political space between itself and mainstream unionism. Much of what the 
PUP currently promotes continues to suggest a distinct fracture with what has gone 
before. Thus, the PUP, through its distinct policies and willingness to engage in de-
bate, has been an important element in a process that has nurtured an increased 
introspection amongst the Protestant working class (see Hall 1994; 1995; 1996; 
Ballymacarret Think Tank 1999a, 1999b; Ballymacarret Arts & Cultural Society 
1999; Seeds of Hope 2000; Shankill Think Tank 1995, 1998). 
In recent times, however, the PUP has also argued (echoing Spence, some 25 
years before) that the increasingly weakened social and economic position which 
many working class Protestants now find themselves in is largely a result of the 
same pattern of social deprivation that affects their counterparts in nationalist ar-
eas. 
Another result of this process has been the reassessment by some of the core val-
ues and beliefs that have guided unionism and their relationship to state of North-
ern Ireland, since its formation. As the party’s official literature says: 
Fifteen years ago, Republican leaders spoke of the fifty-years of hard bitter experi-
ence when referring to the old Stormont Government. Unfortunately, they did not in-
clude the Protestant or Unionist community in that experience. For fifty years there 
had existed the hard line two party state. Uncompromising Unionism faced uncom-
promising Nationalism. The politics of the mind was substituted by the politics of 
emotion maintaining the survival of these two extreme power blocs. The seriousness 
of the matter emerged even before the violent events of the late sixties. Some Union-
ists opposed reasonable legislation simply because it emanated from “Republicans” 
and the Nationalists opposed reasonable legislation simply because it was put for-
-11- 
IBIS WORKING PAPERS NO. 4, 2001 
ward by Unionists. Extremist politicians came to power, not because of any votes 
cast for them, but for votes cast against the other side (PUP 1999). 
Perhaps one of the most striking developments surrounding the PUP is not what 
they are saying (this has been reasonably consistent since around the mid-1980s), 
but, rather, the ideological space which has been created within unionism to allow 
them to openly express such notions. The importance for the future direction of un-
ionism of the ability of the PUP to gain and maintain populist support cannot be 
overstated. Although it is of no little significance that the PUP has successfully pre-
sented its arguments further afield, it is its ability to convince its more immediate 
constituency that will ultimately prove of most importance. 
In the past, many in the Protestant working class have steadfastly refused to be-
lieve that it was possible to seek any political accommodation with their nationalist 
counterparts. Any left of centre articulation of social and economic issues was often 
seen as a direct challenge to unionist control, and sometimes the very legitimacy 
and existence of the Northern Irish state itself. Such views often found little favour 
within working class loyalist communities. For the leadership of the PUP an impor-
tant stated goal remains: 
an injection of working class politics to get people to rally around social and economic 
issues. That won’t make the constitutional problem disappear, but at least it will show 
that there is a common ground on which we can agree and then maybe we can find a 
way forward on the constitution (Cusack and McDonald, 1997: 117). 
Further, the PUP argues that what they see as the intransigence of sections of po-
litical unionism (particularly the DUP and at times the UUP), throughout the peace 
process, has been mostly detrimental to the aspirations of the broader unionist 
community. Rather, the PUP support the idea of power sharing, arguing for a 
“shared responsibility” between the “two traditions” as the basis for a solution. As 
David Ervine has stated: 
We need a parliament that will have within it the politics of left, right and centre. We 
will have the politics of realignment within the Protestant working class and the catho-
lic working class (interview with author, Belfast, 1998). 
The PUP has also increasingly expressed definite views on other social issues. Un-
like most parties in Northern Ireland, they, for example, directly promote women’s 
issues. Indeed, almost half of the PUP executive committee is made up of women. 
The PUP is also one of the few political organisations, certainly amongst unionism, 
which has been openly supportive of gay and lesbian rights (Purvis, 1998) and 
which is candidly pro-choice on the abortion issue (Ward, 1998). It has also given 
serious consideration to policies on urban regeneration, the environment and en-
ergy. Such views are far from primary to traditional expressions of unionist ideol-
ogy. Further, they have in part sought to establish cross-community dialogue and 
support members who have become involved in such projects. 
Another important aspect of PUP ideology is that which justifies its willingness to 
enter into debate with the traditional “enemies of Ulster”. In part, this has mean-
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trecognition that they will have to negotiate and form a working relationship with 
other groupings, including Sinn Féin. In part also, it has given rise to the promotion 
of a series of policies suggesting the need for a Bill of Rights and the introduction a 
written Constitution in Northern Ireland, which are seen as essential in safeguard-
ing minorities in Northern Ireland. Indeed, upon winning his Belfast City Council 
seat, Billy Hutchinson returned to a theme he had raised previously, when he said: 
Why shouldn’t we work with Sinn Féin in the council? The other Unionists do it at the 
moment. If Sinn Féin or anyone else has decent arguments to put forward we will lis-
ten to them, as long as they are for the benefit of all the people of Belfast (Ander-
sonstown News 10, 26 June 1996). 
David Ervine is clear in outlining the importance of achieving these goals. He has 
highlighted this when he said: 
Unionism is extremely reticent to engage Nationalists in talks, mainly because of a 
lack of trust, but we must learn to trust one another. We have the propensity to blame 
somebody else for what is wrong and in Northern Ireland that is truer than most. We 
haven’t grasped that responsibility and I advocate that we do that if we want to go 
forward. There are many roads forward, many avenues of possibility but there is only 
one road backwards. I would advocate that we go forward because we’ve been going 
back for twenty-five years (interview with author, Belfast, 1998). 
This willingness to engage political opposition, even with those constructed as tra-
ditional enemies, directly marks out the PUP from other strands within unionism. 
Until extremely recently the open expression of such a political stance would have 
been untenable from a representative of working class loyalism. It is little wonder 
that such views from the PUP have raised much concern from within unionism it-
self, and drawn such a harsh retort from that section of it, notably the DUP, which 
locate their reading within unionism’s traditional analysis. The PUP has been rela-
tively successful in drawing support. Recent research in which I have been involved 
indicates that over 80% of PUP members have never previously been a member of 
any political party in Northern Ireland (McAuley and Tonge, 2001). 
Needless to say, such views are far from universally accepted within unionism. One 
way of understanding the ruptures within loyalism is to comprehend the differing 
frames of reference and discourses being used to construct conflicting understand-
ings of contemporary events. Here I shall identify two of these as a “discourse of 
perpetuity” and a “discourse of transformation”. 
UNIONIST DISCOURSES OF PERPETUITY 
One key discourse unifying contemporary unionists against the development of the 
peace process is that of betrayal by “Britain”. There remains a deeply held unionist 
belief that the contemporary political settlement marks huge concessions to repub-
licanism and a commitment to a form of unification by stealth. In fact, many union-
ists perceive the entire “peace process” as a reply by the British government to a 
nationalist set agenda in an attempt to “buy off terrorism”. Hence, for many union-
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ists, the latest initiatives surrounding the closer workings of the British and Irish 
Governments and even the introduction of the Northern Ireland Assembly marks 
political defeat. 
Many of those who seek to reproduce this discourse do so in terms of the securing 
of traditional values and react to what they see as a recent history of unionist de-
mise. This is given credence through direct reference to a continuity of events that 
includes the Sunningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements, the Joint Declaration, the 
Framework Proposals and the contemporary Good Friday Agreement. All these at-
tempts at a political settlement are seen as instalments of a longer process involv-
ing steps on a slippery slope to a united Ireland. 
Sections of unionism continue to construct this powerful all-embracing discourse 
capable of forming a coherent social and political identity. Importantly, it is this that 
binds together a multiplicity of other potential identities involving, among others: 
class, nation, gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, language, regional identity, 
lifestyle, religion and workplace. So while unionism is an identity that is capable of 
superimposing itself on these, it is neither fixed nor constant. It is socially con-
structed as a call for individuals to constitute their self around a particular identity. 
Unionism is capable of mobilising those who have been successfully summoned by 
motivating them to engage in particular forms of action and experiences. Further, in 
Northern Ireland, unionism also often demands a public statement from its support-
ers. Unionism, hence, is not only important in identity formation but also in engag-
ing its followers in activism, whether this be in voting behaviour, public meetings, 
rallies or other forms of public events. To be successful unionism in all its contem-
porary forms must draw on the above in some recognisable way. Further, it must 
do so in a way that is capable of confirming these core principles and solidifying to-
gether the identity of its supporters into a coherent politics. 
In response to these competing discourses unionism has responded to contempo-
rary events in a fragmented manner. Some sections of unionism have simply drawn 
directly on long standing discourses and sought to return unionism to the funda-
mentals of its doctrine and oppose what they see as a dilution of the unionist posi-
tion. This can be seen, for example, within the political discourse of the DUP, within 
which the very future existence of Northern Ireland is at stake. Take, for example, 
the following from Peter Robinson, the deputy leader of the party: 
I have been in this Party from its birth and there has not been a moment when we 
have not been in the forefront of the battle. There has not been a period where the 
Party has not been engaged in the struggle to save the Union. We have faced diffi-
culties and hardships and consistently contended against unfriendly odds. We have 
been vilified, demonised and dismissed and our obituary has been written time and 
time again—but we are still here, still in the midst of the fray, still contending and still 
unwavering (Robinson, 1999). 
In recent times the DUP has consistently repeated its claim that the foundations of 
the Union have been made insecure by the implementation of the “treacherous 
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Framework Document” (see DUP, 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1996d). Central to this 
framing is the DUP’s self image as sentinels against Ulster’s enemies (see for ex-
ample, DUP, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999; Paisley 1998). It positions its followers 
around a discourse of fear. As Ian Paisley himself puts it: 
Having ignored all past warnings together with all the vindication that the so-called 
“peace” process was a tactic and a fake, this perfidious and discredited Government 
now incredibly continues its obstinate pursuit of the selfsame agenda ... Blair, Mow-
lam and Clinton have much in common: they are all good liars but bad actors; they 
are tough on talk but weak on action; they all misled the people of Northern Ireland 
and for their deceit and incompetence they should all be impeached for taking advan-
tage of the public trust (Paisley, 1998). 
Such “traditional” unionist values have been increasingly expressed by widening 
factions of unionism. Another example can be found in the writings and speeches 
of Robert McCartney. For some time he has promoted a central duality in his poli-
tics. On the one hand he has offered important criticisms of traditional unionism, 
particularly in its sectarian formation. On the other, however, he has consistently 
utilised and drawn upon traditional unionist discourses and interpretative frames for 
the basis of his politics. 
Hence, elsewhere he has articulated the clear view that the peace process is part 
of an orchestrated conspiracy against unionists and the Union and a process the 
implementation of which “ultimately threatens the very existence of democracy it-
self” (see for example, Belfast Telegraph, 9 July 1999; News Letter, 23 February 
1995; Belfast Telegraph, 29 June 1999. 
From within this perspective the central task of the British Government has been to 
promote a settlement that persuades unionists to sacrifice their British identity. For 
McCartney, the current political settlement is merely part of a broader strategy. 
Both governments albeit for differing reasons, are engaged in a slowly evolving 
scheme in which British identity in Northern Ireland will gradually be replaced with 
an Irish one. The Joint Declaration and the Framework Documents represent the 
medium for achieving this objective, central to which are the development of all-
Ireland institutions with a dynamic for expansion. Unionists are to be persuaded to 
accept the inevitable greening of their cultural and political identity. 
For the British and Irish governments to realise their joint plans, however, the con-
tinued suspension of violence is a necessary condition. Hence the argument that 
huge concessions have been made to the republican movement in return for the 
halting of violence. This was made clear when McCartney claimed the following on 
the issue of decommissioning of paramilitary arms: 
No institution of Government can be properly termed democratic if it includes repre-
sentatives of a minority party that is itself inextricably linked to a terrorist organisation 
insisting on remaining armed for the purpose of achieving political objectives similar 
to those of the minority party fronting it (Belfast Telegraph, 29 June 1999). 
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Robert McCartney argues, therefore, that it was the IRA campaign in Britain (par-
ticularly the bombs at Warrington and the Baltic Exchange in 1993) that structured 
the peace process and accelerated a shift in British policy from internal settlement 
to one of Irish unity. These bombs made the security of the British mainland an 
overriding political priority to which the constitutional future of Northern Ireland has 
become entirely subordinate. The political strategy of the two governments is con-
sidered as a direct attempt to achieve Irish unity, although economic, social, and 
political restraints will require its phased accomplishment. 
This reading of contemporary events is supported by others whose central belief is 
that their British identity expressed as unionism is under attack. This has been 
partly reflected in the wider unionist community. One clear example surrounds the 
contested arenas over the routes to be taken by Orange Order parades and the 
“rights” of Orange lodges to march their “traditional routes” (see Bryan, Fraser and 
Dunn 1995; Jarman 1997, 1998; Jarman and Bryan 1996). 
From a unionist perspective this broader context may be understood if we consider 
the following from the official magazine of the Orange Order: 
The onslaught on Northern Ireland’s British identity continues unabated, both overtly 
and covertly. It is an insidious campaign undertaken on different fronts, but with one 
common objective—the ultimate incorporation of the Province in an all-Ireland in 
which British, Protestant, Orange, and Unionist culture and identity would be 
swamped and eventually eradicated. 
It is the traditional enemies of Protestantism and Unionism—Irish nationalism and re-
publicanism—which is spearheading this attack on Northern Ireland’s loyal ethos. But 
it is being aided and abetted by Government policies which can only have one out-
come—a weakening of Northern Ireland’s position within the United Kingdom (Or-
ange Standard, April 1999, p.1) 
Here the main dynamic of the peace process and the political settlement is seen as 
undermining the British ethos in Northern Ireland, and as subverting Protestants 
from their traditional British allegiance in an attempt to transfer this to Irish national-
ism. The weakening of Orangeism is thus seen as one of the key political policies 
implemented by the enemies of true Ulster loyalism. The perceived drive towards 
“Irishness” is seen in everything from joint initiatives between the two tourist organi-
sations on the island, through the official position of the British Prime Minister, and 
on to the Irish Government. This in turn rests on that construction of the current 
peace process as involving all sorts of hidden dangers to Ulster Protestants, who 
are engaged in “a last battle for Ulster”. Unionists generally must guard unceasingly 
against the insidious propaganda and attempts to subvert their British allegiance. 
This discourse emphasises a particular set of understood realities within unionism. 
It highlights a constructed political identity within a particular form of constitutional 
arrangement. The concern that these arrangements are under threat has most 
straightforwardly been fettered by the DUP in its representation of the situation. 
This is that the unionist people of Northern Ireland are being subject to a process 
driven by an untrustworthy British Government, the dynamic for which comes from 
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the combined forces of Irish nationalism and republicanism, supported by the Irish 
government and the Irish lobby in the USA. 
The inevitable outcome of this will be a united Ireland unless unionists can be 
awoken to the dangers. The core of the DUP project continues to frame the conflict 
in this way and to construct discourses that re-emphasise and reinforce the central 
fears of many unionists. The broad perspective of those promoting perpetuity within 
unionism can thus be set out as follows. The grand strategy behind the peace proc-
ess is to bring about a functionally united Ireland that will ultimately render a trans-
fer of sovereignty inevitable, through a concealed process of unification and a con-
ceding of executive political power to Irish nationalism and republicanism. 
Such a discourse is, however, non-party specific in its appeal and capable of arous-
ing and mobilising across several of the factions of the unionist party political bloc. 
The discourse and politics of perpetuity is now firmly established in the DUP, the 
Orange Order, the UK Unionist Party, that section of the Ulster Unionist Party led 
by Donaldson and across other factions of unionism. It has been given a cutting 
edge in Realpolitik by Reverend William McCrea’s victory in the South Antrim by-
election and by the repositioning of the UUP around the anti-agreement bloc. Both 
these recent events highlight the increasing lack of enthusiasm in the loyalist com-
munity for the Good Friday agreement. 
UNIONIST DISCOURSES OF TRANSFORMATION 
Not all unionists, however, have adopted the above as their key frame of reference. 
Sections of working class loyalism in particular have begun to critically examine 
their historical and cultural identity in a meaningful way. This has been directly re-
flected politically in the rise of the smaller unionist parties, such as the PUP and 
UDP. This experience needs to be understood in the changing context of dramatic 
economic decline, political disarticulation and ideological disintegration within un-
ionism. The period of the peace process has opened up much deliberation within 
loyalist working class communities, one possible reading of which suggests a mar-
ginalisation of sectarianism as a fundamental organising principle. 
This has been reflected in the new politics of loyalism and the continued criticism of 
the traditional leadership of unionism. The Progressive Unionist Party has been to 
the fore in this attempt to restructure unionism. In recent times, the PUP leadership 
has stated its commitment to maintaining and strengthening Northern Ireland’s con-
stitutional position within the United Kingdom. It has repeatedly claimed that it will 
actively work by all democratic means to ensure that there will be no constitutional 
changes that either diminish the constitutional position of Northern Ireland as an in-
tegral part of the United Kingdom or dilute democratic structures and procedures 
within Northern Ireland. 
The party’s recent manifestos have also supported the right of any individual or 
group to seek constitutional change by “democratic, legitimate and peaceful 
means” and spoken of the rights and aspirations of all those who abide by the law 
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regardless of religious, cultural, national or political inclinations. They have also de-
clared that there can never, ever, be a return to “the awful political and social 
abuses of the past and Stormont”. 
Factors such as the above have served to expose inconsistencies in the relation-
ships between key sections of the Protestant working class and the state. Impor-
tantly, from this section of unionism there has been a growing awareness of the 
consequences of a rapidly changing historical, social and economic context. The 
loyalist parties have effectively begun to harness views such as those expressed 
above. In this sense the parties have provided focal points for increasingly coherent 
social, economic and political challenges within unionism. They have also begun to 
confront some of the dominant discourses with unionism. 
These processes have loosened the bonds, and shifted the interpretative frames 
within loyalism; but these developments have not meant that such groupings have 
weakened their commitment to the Union. The position of the loyalist working class 
should be seen in the context of the renegotiation of the ideological boundaries 
within which they seek to express their identity. These shifting contours of unionist 
identity are extremely important. As several commentators (such as Dunn and Mor-
gan, 1994, and Shirlow and McGovern, 1997) and unionist politicians have noted, 
there are widespread feelings from within the Protestant working class that they are 
in decline, increasingly subject to forces of rapid economic, political, cultural and 
psychological retreat. 
The hegemonic construction of a “British” identity by Ulster loyalism has not only 
traditionally included but also absorbed a multitude of other key identities, such as 
gender, geographical location, sexual preference, class identity, and so on. These 
have been organised into a collective political will through an all-embracing dis-
course. New loyalism may provide the dynamic to begin to separate these key 
identities, and to reformulate its central components. This may forms the basis for 
the creation of alternative discourses and locations of identity within unionism, be-
yond those examined below. 
CONTESTING LOYALISM’S FUTURE 
The contemporary period has often revealed overt antagonism between the PUP 
and other sections of the unionist political leadership of the UUP and the DUP. The 
broad politics of those promoting unionist perpetuity can be set out as follows. The 
current political settlement is merely part of a broader strategy whereby unionists 
are to be persuaded to accept the inevitable greening of their cultural and political 
identity. The grand strategy behind the peace process is to bring about a function-
ally united Ireland that will ultimately render a transfer of sovereignty inevitable, 
through a concealed process of unification (see the Irish Times, 26 January 1998). 
Here the main dynamic of the peace process and the political settlement is per-
ceived as undermining the British ethos in Northern Ireland, and as subverting Prot-
estants from their traditional British allegiance in an attempt to transfer this to Irish 
nationalism. 
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Whether tangible or not, there is strong historical evidence to suggest that when-
ever this discourse has become dominant, unionists have traditionally returned to 
an entrenched position. Many of those that seek to reproduce a discourse of perpe-
tuity do so in reaction to what they see as a recent history of demise. This is given 
credence through direct reference to a continuity of events that includes the Sun-
ningdale and Anglo-Irish Agreements, the Joint Declaration, the Framework Pro-
posals and the contemporary Good Friday Agreement. All these attempts at a po-
litical settlement are seen as instalments of a longer process involving steps on a 
slippery slope to a united Ireland (see most recent editions of The Orange Standard 
or the DUP website: http://www.dup.org). The growing prominence of the PUP 
clearly has not gone uncontested from within these sections of unionism. 
Another focus of hostility towards the PUP comes from those forces coalescing 
around sections of the loyalist paramilitaries, particularly the Loyalist Volunteer 
Force (LVF) and parts of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). The LVF, led until 
his murder by the late Billy Wright, was formed by disillusioned paramilitaries from 
within the UVF and UDA. It broke with the leadership, claiming that the UDP and 
PUP were selling out the “loyalist people” through an uncritical acceptance of the 
peace process. 
This grouping openly seek to oppose what they call the “peace (surrender) deal” 
and to undermine the PUP leadership. A special loathing appears to be reserved 
for Ervine, who has been accused in pamphlets and graffiti of “treachery”, of being 
an “MI5 agent”, of working “hand-in hand with the enemies of Ulster” and of having 
lost contact with his loyalist roots (see various editions of The Volunteer; Leading 
the Way; The Wright View). They have also claimed that, “Billy Hutchinson and 
Davy Ervine are more than willing to sit around a table with the enemies of our 
country” (Leading the way, no date). Such views played a central role in the loyalist 
feud that occurred during much of 2000. The tensions are far from resolved and it is 
conceivable that the section of the loyalist paramilitaries who seek to reaffirm the 
conflict or break with the political settlement may yet undermine the political, organ-
isational and electoral position of the PUP. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
These shifting contours of unionist identity are extremely important. The hegemonic 
construction of a “British” identity by Ulster loyalism, has not only traditionally in-
cluded, but also absorbed a multitude of other key identities, such as gender, geo-
graphical location, sexual preference, class identity, and so on. These have been 
organised into a collective political will through an all-embracing discourse. New 
loyalism may provide the dynamic to begin to separate these key identities, and to 
reformulate its central components. This may form the basis for the creation of al-
ternative discourses and locations of identity within unionism. 
At one level, shifts in unionist politics have been intricate. At another, however, they 
have been remarkably simplified. It is possible to suggest two major readings 
around which unionism is politically mobilising. The first suggests that unionism 
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must strengthen its traditional form; the second, that to continue, unionism must 
change to adopt a more pluralist form. These discourses can be broadly addressed 
as those that seek to reinforce traditional unionist perspectives and those promot-
ing some form of social or political change. Fragmenting as it has along these fault 
lines; unionism as an ideology and as a political force is in no small state of up-
heaval. 
In the period following the ceasefires and the Good Friday Agreement “traditional 
unionism” found it increasingly difficult to dominate the discourses of identity. Un-
ionist hegemony was increasingly challenged from within by those with alternative 
notions of the nature of unionism. These groupings set about articulating a class 
and sometimes a gender perspective concerning the right to have their respective 
politics included within a redefinition of unionist identity and political unionism (see 
McAuley 1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998, 1999; Sales 
1997a, 1997b, 1998; Rooney 1992, 2000; Democratic Dialogue 1996). 
The most recent period, however, has witnessed a strong restatement of union-
ism’s previously dominant values. The DUP remains foremost in its continued criti-
cism of those loyalists engaged in the search for a settlement. Further, the DUP is 
no longer marginalised in this position. The discourse constructed is capable of ral-
lying significant sections of unionism against any continued settlement. 
In this context, therefore, there are serious and difficult questions to be asked about 
for whom the PUP speak and how far the leadership’s thinking may be ahead of the 
ordinary working class Protestants they seek to represent. It is also clear that be-
cause of its origins the PUP may only able to draw upon a limited, if still growing, 
constituency. The society in which the PUP exists largely remains structured and 
determined by sectarian social relations. Given its origins and the still close rela-
tionship with a particular paramilitary organisation, one of the indisputable tests for 
the PUP is whether it can develop any genuine cross community recognition for the 
merit of its position. Such a task is not made easier in the wake of a bloody feud 
between the major loyalist paramilitary groups. 
That is not to say that key individuals within the PUP leadership, such as Ervine 
and Hutchinson, are not serious in their belief that the approach of the PUP is the 
key to unlocking divisions within Northern Ireland and bringing “real” politics to the 
fore. Their first goal, however, must remain that of convincing working class union-
ism of the validity and substance of the PUP’s position. 
Factors such as those outlined above have served to expose a growing awareness 
of some of the consequences of a rapidly changing historical, social and economic 
context. The PUP, certainly in the period immediately following the ceasefires and 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, harnessed this dynamic and provided 
key focal points for increasingly coherent challenge within unionism. This should be 
seen in the context of the renegotiations of the ideological boundaries within which 
they seek to express their identity. 
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These processes have loosened some of the political and ideological bonds within 
unionism, and shifted some of the interpretative frames within loyalism. Should the 
PUP project succeed, then what we may well witness is a permanent breach within 
unionist politics and ideology. This would offer the possibility of the development of 
an authentic cross-community politics developing in Northern Ireland. However, 
whether or not that is the final outcome of the contemporary period is still some way 
from being determined. 
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